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Introduction
Universal service for telephony has at least nominally been a public policy concern for over a century. 1 Universal service policies for ordinary telephone service were expanded significantly in the wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, subsequently were expanded to encompass wireless service, and currently are under consideration for Internet service (e.g. Office of
Congresswoman Doris Matsui, 2009; Federal Communications Commission, 2012) . Globally, universal service in telecommunications can be important for economic growth (Roller and Waverman, 2001) , and expanding service is a priority in development policy (Estache and WrenLewis, 2009 ). Universal service concerns usually are directed at two different, but somewhat overlapping, groups: rural and low-income households. Our focus is to develop a model of the demand of low-income households and to understand the economic factors affecting their decisions to subscribe to telephone service. Our model uses U.S. Census microdata to evaluate the effectiveness of the Lifeline and Linkup subsidy programs at increasing the telephone penetration of low-income households. Our study develops methodology and employs appropriate data for evaluating the effectiveness of low-income subsidy programs. By measuring the determinants of telephone penetration of low-income households across different demographic groups, the study provides policy makers and the Census Bureau new information pertinent to "universal service" and the "digital divide." 2 The new framework, and an understanding of its data requirements, is important for evaluating current telephone subsidy programs, and potentially for the gathering debate on Internet access subsidies.
Overall telephone penetration in the U.S. is high -over 94% in 2000 according to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) "Penetration Report." 3 This substantial achievement of universal service masks considerable demographic variation. Penetration rates are lower for low-income households -less than 87% of households with income less than 1 The term "universal service" refers to the extent to which households have access to telecommunications services. Mueller (1997) dates the origin of the phrase to the AT&T's Annual Report in 1907, although this was in reference to AT&T interconnecting with competitors. 2 Maintaining and enhancing universal service is a stated goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. See Riordan (2002) for a more complete background on the economics of universal service. "Digital divide" refers to differences in the extent to which households have access to advanced telecommunications and information services. There is fair consensus that some kind of digital divide exists, but continuing debate on the causes and magnitude of the divide, and whether it is growing or narrowing, and what, if anything, to do from a policy perspective. 3 The penetration data for the report (Belinfante, 2001 ) is based on the Current Population Survey. The report's income cutoffs are in March 1984 dollars, based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). $10,000 had a working telephone in their households. Telephone penetration in 2000 varied from 80% for households with an annual income below $5,000 to 98.4% for households above $75,000, and from 95.2% for white households to 89.3% for black households. The demographic variation was even greater for low-income households. For example, 83.1% of white households with an annual income below $5,000 had telephone service, while 73% of low-income black households had telephone service. A major goal of our analysis is to better understand the reasons for this demographic variation.
In the United States there are two major low-income support programs for telephone service. The Lifeline program provides a subsidy that reduces monthly charges for eligible lowincome subscribers. The Linkup program reduces the initial connection fee that low-income households pay to establish telephone service. In the wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the FCC dramatically increased the size of its basic Lifeline subsidy and provided additional matching support for state-funded Lifeline programs. 4 The states responded to the federal matching support opportunity in various ways. The FCC's implementation of the 1996 Act did not change the federal Linkup subsidy. Census. With demographic details from a cross-section of over a million households, we can estimate how demographics affect both elasticities of telephone adoption and levels of telephone 4 For specifics of the Lifeline program, see the unpublished predecessor of this paper, Ackerberg et al. (2009) . 5 The federal Linkup program reduces low-income subscribers' initial connection charge by 50 percent of the customary charge, or $30, whichever is less. Both Lifeline and Linkup are funded by taxes on telecommunications services. To the extent that low-income households are heavy users of the services taxed (e.g. long distance), the overall price reduction is less. Marginal subscribers are not likely to be heavy users of the taxed services, so lowincome telecommunications users presumably experience a price decrease. See Hausman et al. (1993). penetration, while public data only allow for crude estimates from aggregates at the Census Block Group level. We consider penetration specifically for poor households (rather than overall penetration), so implicitly we allow price sensitivity for low-income populations to differ from the rest of the population. The distinction between the elasticity effects and level effects of demographics is empirically important. We show that home ownership and age do little to explain the differences in the level of penetration between races, but they explain much of the gap in elasticities of adoption between races. We find that young renters are the group that can be most easily influenced through universal service subsidies. Our results matter for public utility commissioners who target particular groups. 6 Our work further differs in at least three important ways from existing published studies that evaluate the aggregate impact of Lifeline and Linkup. 7 First, using various data sources, we have constructed a dataset that is more extensive than other datasets used to study low-income telephone penetration. We use prices at a disaggregated level, rather than the state level, and we directly exploit price variation resulting from new Lifeline subsidies introduced in wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. We also use specific Linkup prices, rather than a Linkup dummy.
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Studies that rely on statewide data use statewide-average residential prices, which mask substantial information because residential service prices can vary substantially within states.
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For example, in California in 2000, monthly rates for 100 calls a month for Lifeline customers varied from $5.01 to $6.90 and for non-Lifeline customers varied from $11.62 to $15.51. Data on prices and service characteristics obtained from Bell Operating Company (BOC) tariffs and Census microdata on telephone penetration and demographics are matched to more than 6,000 wire centers in 39 states and the District of Columbia. 10 Second, our preferred specification controls for the possible endogeneity of Lifeline prices.
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Lifeline price endogeneity is a concern because states responded to post-1996 changes 6 For example, many state public utility commissions have Lifeline and Linkup programs that target senior citizens. 7 Unpublished predecessors of this paper, Ackerberg et al. (2009 Ackerberg et al. ( , 2011 , also make these advances using public data. 8 Crandall and Waverman (2000) use a dummy variable for Linkup and obtain an unexpected negative effect on penetration. They suggest the result is a consequence of limited variation: only two states lacked a Linkup program in 1990. They also suggest their Linkup result may be due to reverse-causation: states with high penetration rates choosing not to participate in federal low-income programs. 9 For example, Thompson (2002, 2003) use state-level data from the four decades of the Decennial Census and Erikson, Kaserman, and May (1998) use state-level data from the Current Population Survey. 10 A wire center is a geographic area that includes all customers connected to a particular local switch. 11 Crandall and Waverman (2000) acknowledge the endogeneity issue. They attempted to estimate equations with Lifeline and Linkup as endogenous variables but were unsuccessful. in federal Lifeline policy differently. Ignoring this endogeneity potentially biases downward the estimated elasticity of demand with respect to Lifeline prices. In addition, we also use the size of the local calling area as an explanatory variable.
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The inclusion of this value-of-service variable in the demand specification by itself may alleviate price endogeneity because states typically set higher prices in places with larger local calling areas.
Third, our specifications control for automatic enrollment policies. In some states, there are low-income programs that automatically establish eligibility for Lifeline and Linkup.
Households participating in those programs can ask the office administering the program to automatically initiate enrollment. In other states, the burden is on the household to establish eligibility. We interpret automatic enrollment policies as reducing the transaction cost of securing subsidized service.
The rich dataset and our exclusive focus on poor populations allow us to estimate elasticities with respect to Lifeline and Linkup prices. Our estimate of the elasticity of lowincome household demand with respect to actual Lifeline prices is -0.021, using our preferred model with endogenous prices. Our estimate of the elasticity with respect to actual Linkup prices is -0.014. Although these estimates are low, they are substantially higher than in recent studies.
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For example, Garbacz and Thompson (2003) estimate a price elasticity of demand for local service ranging from -0.006 to -0.011 in 2000 for the population as a whole.
14 By comparing the two elasticities, we obtain an estimate of these households' discount rate that is equivalent to a 1,723% annual interest rate, supporting the hypothesis that these households may be severely liquidity constrained. 15 We determine that Lifeline and Linkup subsidies in 2000 increased the telephone penetration of poor households in our sample by 6.1 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval between 2.7 and 9.6 percentage points. We estimate that if states had expanded Lifeline 12 Perl (1984) and Taylor and Kridel (1990) use the size of the local calling area as an explanatory variable. 13 Earlier studies had estimated higher price elasticities of demand for low-income households than the average income household, thus providing some empirical justification for the first versions of the Lifeline and Linkup programs that were implemented in the 1980s (Perl, 1984; Taylor and Kridel, 1990; Cain and MacDonald, 1991) . 14 Crandall and Waverman (2000) use location-specific local service prices and Lifeline rates in 1990 and find no significant impact of Lifeline programs, and they find the Linkup program has a negative effect on penetration. They do find that a higher charge for connecting a new subscriber leads to an elasticity of penetration ranging from -0.025 to -0.030 with respect to the unsubsidized connection charge. Erikson, Kaserman and Mayo (1998) find that targeted low-income subsidies have a small positive effect on state-level penetration rates, while untargeted subsidies do not have a statistically significant impact on penetration rates. 15 Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) estimated a 1,415% annual discount rate for a subprime loan market, which they interpret similarly.
and Linkup to the a maximum level of funding that fully subsidized Linkup and took full advantage of the federal match for Lifeline, then penetration would have increased by a further 2.1 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval between 0.9 and 3.2 percentage points. 16 We find that Linkup is far more cost effective than Lifeline because it is targeted at lowincome households that do not have telephone service, and because of the extremely large discount rates in this population. We also find that the automatic enrollment programs are effective at increasing telephone penetration. Perhaps surprisingly, the Federal Communications Commission recently eliminated the Linkup support program except on (Native American)
Tribal lands (FCC, 2012) . We take issue with this reform in our conclusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out a theoretical model of the low-income demand for subsidized telephone service that is the basis for our econometric model, including a justification why low-income demand should depend only on Lifeline and Linkup price and not the normal connection and subscription prices. Section 3 explains our data. Section 4 includes estimation results and policy experiments, and Section 5 concludes.
Model of telephone service subscription

Basic model
Telephone service enables a consumer to place and receive calls. The value of service depends on the characteristics of the consumer and on the characteristics of the service. Both sources of variation help explain why different demographic groups have different aggregate penetration rates, as well as why different locations have different penetration rates. Different population groups may exhibit different demands for service due to different tastes, and may be asymmetrically distributed across locations with varying service characteristics (including prices). Our goal is to develop a model that captures these variations.
The following simple model explains how household's probability of subscribing to telephone service depends on the household's group classification and location. Suppose that the population of households can be partitioned into G groups based on observable characteristics, 16 In contrast, Garbacz and Thompson (2003) estimate that a 10 percent increase in Linkup and Lifeline expenditures would have added only 20,000 households to the network in 2000.
and L locations based on service characteristics. The value of service to consumer i belonging to group g at location l is where and are group-specific parameters, is a location fixed effect (that includes, e.g., the effect of location specific prices), and is an idiosyncratic household characteristic.
Assume for simplicity that has a standard exponential distribution for all groups in all locations. Then 1 ( 1 )
is the mean utility of households belonging to group g in location l.
The household subscribes to service if the value of service is positive. Therefore, the probability of adoption for a member of group g in location l is:
Note the probability of adoption is 1 if the deterministic component of the value of service is weakly greater than 0. This is because of the positive support of the exponential distribution.
Additional structure is placed on the model by assuming that the location fixed effect depends linearly on location characteristics:
where is price of service, is a vector of observable exogenous characteristics (including a constant term) and is an unobservable characteristic. Finally, the price of service is endogenously determined by exogenous characteristics and another location specific unobservable :
where is a vector containing and other elements excluded from . We allow the two location specific unobservables to be correlated. Our particular assumptions about price endogeneity, discussed later, determine the "excluded instruments."
Estimation of the Basic Model
This basic model of household demand explains variations in observed penetration rates across groups and locations, and provides a basis for estimation. Suppose that location l has n gl households belonging to group g. If is independent across households in a location (and
independent of the exogenous variables , then, conditional on , the probability of exactly households adopting service is binomial. Since is a function of observable data and the unobservables , we assume , also independent of , and integrate these out to form the likelihood of the endogenous variables at a particular location:
where is the standard normal pdf and is the conditional normal distribution implied by the variance matrix . We evaluate the one-dimensional integral in this likelihood using quadrature.
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The unobservables may capture both unobserved location-specific tastes and unobserved characteristics of telephone service in a particular location. Given the geographic nature of the data, we are hesitant to assume that these unobservables are uncorrelated across locations, particularly those in the same state (since, e.g. unobserved service characteristics might be decided at the state level). One option would be to fully specify the joint distribution of across the locations in a state and consider a joint likelihood. Alternatively, we take a semi-parametric approach by following the "quasi-likelihood" literature (Avery, Hansen, and 17 Alternatively, one could treat the 's as parameters and estimate them (along with the group parameters ) based on a simple binomial likelihood. While this provides consistent estimates of without assumptions on the unobservables , the parameters would need to be estimated in auxiliary regressions (with the estimated 's as dependent variables, and with assumptions on ). Moreover, these auxiliary regressions have complicated censoring problems since not only is estimated, but it is also not point identified in locations where everyone adopts or nobody adopts. 18 We simply discretize the conditional normal into a 40 point distribution. , 1983; Wooldridge, 2002) . More specifically, as long as the marginal distribution of in each location l is specified correctly, it will be the case that This moment can be used to form a GMM estimator for the parameters without specifying the joint distribution of across locations. Then, clustering the GMM variance formula at the state level implicitly allows arbitrary dependence across locations. This clustering is particularly important for obtaining realistic standard errors for the price coefficient, since most of the variation in prices (and the instruments for prices) is at the state level.
Allowing for Adoption and Switching Costs
According to the basic model, the probability that a household belonging to group g at location l has service is . If there is an additional time and effort cost for a household to adopt service (or switch to a different type of service), then the constant term in  x x l can be interpreted to include this transaction cost, or, more precisely, its amortized value over an appropriate horizon.
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Under certain assumptions, this is consistent with a simple dynamic model of service adoption.
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Switching costs provide a simple explanation why all eligible households do not adopt lower priced universal plans when these plans unexpectedly become available (our data suggests that this is the case). Suppose that consumers at location l initially pay for service, but that a subsidized service plan suddenly becomes available at a discount of . The expected demand for service increases from to . Previous subscribers will continue to pay if their cost of switching from normal to subsidized service exceeds , while new subscribers will pay the discounted price . The relevant price for determining total demand 19 Similarly, if there is monetary cost of connection or switching, then is interpreted to include its amortized value. We will be more explicit about this later in the empirical application of the model. 20 For example, a situation where price and service characteristics are expected to remain constant over time.
after the introduction of the subsidized plan is , even though previous subscribers may pay a higher price. That is, the introduction of subsidized service results simply in a movement down the demand curve, and the relevant price for determining total penetration is the subsidized price.
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Matters are more complicated if not all households are eligible for the subsidized service plan. If only a fraction of consumers belonging to group g at location l are eligible for the subsidized plan, then the increase in expected subscription is only .
In this case, total penetration would depend on both the normal price and the subsidized price . In this case, estimation of the basic model using only subsidized prices intuitively would yield a downwardly biased estimate of the price elasticity of demand. 
Data
We composed our dataset using various sources: confidential data from the 2000 decennial households with particular demographic characteristics and whether these household have access to a working telephone. The demographic characteristics we consider are race, home ownership, age, and gender of the head of household. Our main dependent variable is a wire center's penetration rate for low-income households belonging to different demographic groups 21 The same is true if consumers rationally expected the lower price and delay adoption even though they otherwise were willing to adopt at the normal price (assuming they expect the lower price to remain constant into the future), or if there is heterogeneity in switching cost (captured by ) and the households with lower switching costs do switch plans once the new lower-priced service becomes available. 22 The elasticity with respect to a subsidy for which all households are eligible is where P and Q are the initial price and penetration, and is the increase in penetration in response to a small subsidy S. If only a fraction of households were eligible for the subsidy, then the observed change in penetration would be only and the estimated elasticity would be . We sought to estimate a fixed  with an alternative more flexible specification that included normal subscription charges as well as Lifeline and Linkup rates. The point estimates across different specifications were close to one, although standard errors were high, and the estimated price sensitivities were similar in magnitude to those we report.
(Penetration); this variable equals the number of low-income households in a particular group with telephone service divided by the total number of low-income households in that demographic group. The variation in penetration across the major demographics in our study is clear from Table 1 . A first glance at the data reveals large variation in the penetration by race in the sample, ranging from 82.8 percent for Native Americans to 97.5 for Asians. The data reveals differences in penetration between renters and owners and seniors and others. There is lesser variation between male and female household heads.
Data on the price of basic local telephone service including connection charges, Lifeline and Linkup discounts, and other information were obtained from the BOC telephone tariffs. Our data set also includes variables that proxy the cost of providing local service and several other variables relevant for state regulation. These variables are used as instruments to control for possible price endogeneity.
Our final dataset for analysis includes 6,426 wire centers from 39 states and the District of Columbia. Our dataset includes states where service was provided by one of the original BOCs where each household in a wire center was charged the same price.
24
We drop 820 wire centers for which appropriate price data were unavailable, because in rural areas a single switch may serve multiple localities with different prices. Another concern is that takeup of Lifeline and Linkup among eligible households is far less than universal.
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Various state eligibility requirements as well as lack of information are potential obstacles to takeup. For eligibility, 23 The sample size differs from the 7.7 million households covered by Ackerberg et al. (2009) because that paper uses the public Census dataset, which weights and aggregates survey responses and imputes the telephone usage of survey non-respondents. There were 12.4 million poor households in the U.S. according to the 2000 Census. 24 The initial dataset included 7,938 wire centers located in 43 states and the District of Columbia in the original BOC regions. Excluded states are Alaska, Hawaii and Connecticut, which were not served by BOCs; Delaware, which is not included in the FCC (2000a) cost model; and Montana, Wyoming and Vermont, which set different prices for households served by each switch depending on the distance from the switch so that it was impossible to accurately determine the prices faced by low-income households. Southern New England Telephone, which serves Connecticut, was purchased by SBC following passage of the Telecom Act of 1996. 25 The FCC (2003) estimates that in 2000 only 37.5 percent of the Lifeline-eligible households participated.
some states use income cut-off level, while others use participation in means-tested programs.
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Recall that our model addresses the takeup issue by assuming that non-takeup households are not marginal consumers, i.e. these households would have phone service even without the 1996 increase in subsidies.
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We drop an additional 692 wire centers in four states where low-income households faced relatively restrictive eligibility criteria.
The explanatory variables of primary interest are the subsidized charge for local service and the subsidized connection charge for initiating service. The empirical analysis uses the variable Lifeline50, which is the minimum monthly expenditure of Lifeline customers making 50 local calls.
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The other price variable of primary interest is Linkup, which is equal to the connection charge paid by customers eligible for the Linkup subsidy.
An important characteristic of telephone service is the number of people within a customer's local calling area (LCA). The independent variable LCA is equal to the number of households within a customer's local calling area.
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Customers with flat-rate service can make an unlimited number of calls to customers located within their LCA. When subscribing to a usagebased plan, the rates for local calls are lower than charges for calls outside the customer's LCA.
We expect a positive relationship between LCA and Penetration holding other factors constant.
We also consider an additional service characteristic 28 Customers subscribing to a flat-rate plan pay a monthly charge and are allowed to make an unlimited number of local calls. LifelineX is the minimum basic monthly charge plus usage charges across all available plans assuming the customer completes X three-minute local calls. The monthly charge component equals the non-Lifeline monthly charge, including the federal subscriber line charge (SLC), less the total Lifeline discount; LifelineX includes extended area of service surcharges when such surcharges are non-optional. See Ackerberg et al. (2011) for a robustness check, in which the estimation uses Lifeline100, the minimum monthly expense for making 100 calls. 29 In wire centers that serve more than one locality, the household-weighted average LCA is used for the wire center. LCA is constructed from tariffs, census data, Telecordia (2000), and Claritas (2003). enrollment programs.
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Such programs lower the transaction cost of obtaining subsidized service. 31 We also control for the median income and population density in a location, thus allowing that telephone service is more (or less) valuable in higher income and less rural/more urban communities. Median Income equals the median income (in $1000s) of households served by a the wire center, the variable Rural is the percent of wire-center households living in rural areas, and the variable MSA is the percent of wire-center households living in a metropolitan statistical area.
Endogenous Variables and Instruments
We consider the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variable Lifeline50. As explained earlier, we are particularly concerned about the possible endogeneity of Lifeline rates because the magnitude of the increases in Lifeline subsidies after 1996 varied significantly across states.
Endogeneity could arise if state regulators set these subsidies based on , i.e. unobserved (to the econometrician) service characteristics or characteristics of the low-income population.
In considering the possible endogeneity of Lifeline50, it is useful to suppose that regulators choose an appropriate subsidy for low-income households, and then subtract this from the normal monthly price:
where Monthly50 is the normal minimum monthly expenditure for 50 calls, and Subsidy50 is the discount offered to Lifeline-eligible low-income households. Since the Subsidy50 component is directed specifically at low-income households, and since these subsidies were significantly 30 The FCC (2003) reports that three states -MA, NY and ND -had automatic enrollment programs. In Massachusetts, households that qualify for the low-income heating assistance program (LIHEAP) were allowed to have the LIHEAP-administrating office contact Verizon and enroll them in the Lifeline program. The New York Department of Family Assistance (NYDFA) automatically enrolled a household in the Lifeline and Linkup program when it enrolled in a NYDFA program. The North Dakota Department of Human Services sent certificates to households that allowed them to enroll in Lifeline and Linkup programs when they were determined eligible for a program that qualified them as eligible for Lifeline and Linkup. Information from Center for Media Education/Center for Policy Alternatives (1999) and local tariffs were used to verify that these programs were in place on January 1, 2000. 31 Ackerberg et al. (2011) uses public telephone data to consider the effects on penetration of service characteristics not included in the current paper. One experiment involves expanding the Autoenroll dummy to include three states that adopted programs to reduce the transaction costs of enrolling in the Lifeline and Linkup programs. The inclusion of these states does not impact results. Another service characteristic is the rates charged for intrastate long-distance calls, as emphasized by Hausman, Tardiff, and Belinfante (1993) . Results using the rate for a fourminute call were the wrong sign and statistically insignificant. Regarding the possible endogeneity of Linkup, an important issue is the way in which the Federal Government funds low-income subsidy programs, and the resulting incentives for states.
As discussed in the introduction, the Lifeline and Linkup programs differ in the extent to which the Federal Government provides matching incentives. In the Lifeline program the federal subsidy increases with the amount of state subsidy, i.e. the state subsidy is "matched." In contrast, in the Linkup program the federal subsidy is fixed at 50% of the customary rate (up to $30). Thus, any state subsidization of the Linkup rate is not matched by the federal government.
Presumably in response to these strong economic incentives, 32 (80%) of the 40 state (or D.C) governments in our sample provide additional Lifeline subsidies, while only 11 (27.5%) provide 32 We emphasize that just because Monthly50 is set for non-low-income households does not guarantee that it is uncorrelated with u l for low-income households. For example, demand shocks may be correlated across low-income and non-low-income households, and Monthly50 might be set in response to non-low-income demand shocks. Or, Monthly50 might be set in response to unobserved product characteristics that affect both non-low-income and lowincome demand. There may be political reasons why states primarily subsidized Lifeline. While Linkup subsidies target a small group of eligible households who have not adopted yet or have just moved, Lifeline subsidies benefit all low-income households. Hence Lifeline subsidies may be politically more feasible. 34 Like Monthly50, the customary connection charge is set for all households, not specifically for low-income households. Also like Monthly50, this customary rate typically does not vary much over time. 35 Ackerberg et. al. (2011) acknowledge that not finding endogeneity could be due to the weakness of the instruments for Linkup and/or Autoenroll Regardless, the Lifeline50 coefficients were stable across all possible endogeneity assumptions. 36 In particular, we maintain that the instruments are uncorrelated with unobserved service characteristics. While this may be a strong assumption, it is very common in the differentiated products demand literature (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995) . 37 Like Rosston, Savage and Wimmer (2008) , we also considered the BOCs' average forward-looking cost of service constructed from the FCC (2000a) Hybrid Cost Proxy Model (HCPM) as an alternative proxy, but discovered that State Rural had more explanatory power. State regulation of rates is generally based on historical rather than forward-looking cost. 38 Recall that we include the percent of households living in rural areas in the wire center as an explanatory variable (Rural). Hence, we do allow the level of ruralness in a location to affect telephone demand in that location. The instrument State Rural capitalizes on the fact that subsidies are primarily set at the state level. This generates across-state variation in the subsidy conditional on the level of ruralness in a location. We also considered the state poverty rate as an instrument, but found that it did not change our estimates very much.
The variable Competition (FCC, 1996) measures whether a state had allowed competitive entry in 1995, before passage of the Act, and whether competitors had begun providing local switched services in a state by 1995. Knittel (2004) finds that the introduction of competition before the Act reduced the amount of cross-subsidization present in local telephone markets.
Specifically, he shows that residential prices were higher and business prices were lower in states with active competition. Our hypothesis is that universal service subsidies might be less generous with less cross-subsidization from the business segment. Location characteristics include the monthly service price (Lifeline50) and the connection charge (Linkup), the log of the size of the local calling area (lnLCA), and whether eligible households are enrolled automatically in low-income programs (Autoenroll). Additional location characteristics determining the penetration are the median household income of the wire center (Median Income), the percent households in the wire center classified as living in rural census areas (Rural), and whether the wire center is in an urban area (MSA).
Results
The first column reports the estimates, and standard errors in parentheses, for a particularly simple model for which there are just five groups distinguished by race alone, the 's are assumed constant across groups, and all explanatory variables are assumed exogenous.
The coefficients on the dummy variables for race (determining ) indicate that, ceteris paribus, Asian households have a higher demand for telephone service than White households, while Black, Native American, and other households have a lower demand. The main coefficients of The five group model estimated in the first column is the same as in Ackerberg et al.
(2011), which relies on public census data. The public data are more aggregated than the confidential census data used in the present paper. Nevertheless, the estimates are roughly the same. The main difference is that the less aggregated data result in lower standard errors, especially on the coefficients related to the demographic variables. The microdata estimates allow us to conclude much more confidently that these estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero.
A further advantage is that the more disaggregated data enables us to control for additional demographic characteristics. The second column of Table 3 reports coefficient estimates for a richer model with forty demographic groups, while still holding the taste parameter constant across groups, and maintaining the exogeneity assumption. While the additional demographic characteristics are important for determining demand, the other coefficient estimates do not change very much. The price sensitivity coefficient on Lifeline50 is lower, suggesting that additional demographic controls correct an omitted variable bias in estimating this key coefficient. The estimated coefficient on Linkup, on the other hand, is stable.
As a result, the implied Discount Rate is higher.
The third column reports estimates for the full exogenous model, in which and both vary across the forty demographic groups. The estimated coefficients on Lifeline50 and
Linkup are about twice the size of the simpler model, while the corresponding standard errors are much larger. This more flexible model also allows for demographic variation in how demand varies with price and service characteristics. For example, White households are less sensitive to price than Black and Native American households, and are more sensitive than Asian households. These estimates suggest that the more flexible specification yields improved estimates of demand elasticities for different demographic groups.
The remaining specifications allow the Lifeline prices to be endogenous. The fourth column allows the Lifeline subsidy to be endogenous, while maintaining that the normal monthly subscription price is exogenous. The most important effect of this relaxation of the exogeneity assumption is to raise the estimated coefficient on Lifeline50. This suggests that a failure to control for endogeneity biases downward the estimated effect of Lifeline subsidies on the demand for telephone service by poor households. Finally, the fifth column allows the entirety of the Lifeline price to be endogenous. This results in an even greater estimated price sensitivity for Lifeline50. These results are consistent with Lifeline prices being positively correlated with unobserved components of demand, which seems a plausible result of policies intended to subsidize adoption rates (e.g. where larger subsidies are given in areas with lower demand). The other coefficient estimates of the model are relatively stable across the three different endogeneity hypotheses represented in the last three columns.
In our specification that allows the full Lifeline price to be endogenous, our point estimate of the monthly discount rate is lower than the other specifications (27%) and arguably more plausible. However, this is still extremely high. Interestingly, Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) obtain a similar estimate of the discount rate (an annual discount rate of 1,415%, corresponding to about 25% per month) in their study of subprime auto lending. Our comparison of Linkup and Lifeline elasticities is analogous to their comparison of consumer price responsiveness to loan down payments vs. monthly payments. Presumably our sample of poor households is similar to their sample of purchasers of subprime auto loans, and like them we interpret this as reduced form evidence of severe credit constraints whereby poor households have trouble financing upfront connection charges.
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The differential sensitivity to Lifeline and 39 Ideally one might want a formal model of credit constraints, but like Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009), we lack data (e.g. household wealth) to estimate such a model.
Linkup prices that is reflected by our large estimated discount rate plays an important role in the policy analysis later in the paper. Table 3 as our preferred specification, because this is less restrictive than the others.
Elasticities
We adopt the Lifeline Endogenous model as our preferred model and use it to calculate price elasticities for monthly Lifeline charges and initial Linkup charges. These elasticities are calculated by using the model to estimate the percentage aggregate change in penetration for each of the forty demographic groups from raising prices across locations by one percent, as well in the aggregate change for each of the five racial groups. The model is well suited for these calculations because the flexible specification allows price sensitivities to vary with demographic characteristics.
Our elasticity calculations are based on a counterfactual exercise: How would the penetration levels of different demographic groups change if prices were raised by one percent?
To perform the counterfactual, we employ Bayes' Rule and information on actual penetrations at current prices to derive the posterior distribution of the unobservable location characteristics that matter for adoption of telephone service.
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The resulting elasticity estimates are reported in Table 5 , separately for Lifeline and Linkup. It is apparent that all of the estimated elasticities are small quantitatively. Most, but not all, are statistically significant at conventional levels, although significance levels and standard errors are not reported in the table to avoid clutter. The total elasticities for Lifeline and Linkup are -0.02109 and -0.01404 respectively, and these are significantly different from zero at the 99% level of confidence. As noted in the Introduction, these estimates are somewhat higher than those previously reported for the general population, and thus consistent with previous findings that the demand of low-income demand households is more price-sensitive. The estimated elasticities are not too different across races, although Blacks and Native Americans have somewhat higher estimated elasticities than other population groups. Homeowner and senior head-of-household subpopulations are less price sensitive than the total low-income population.
Part of the reason for the greater overall elasticities of black and Native American low-income populations is be that greater proportions of these are renters, especially for non-senior heads of household.
Decompositions
The summary statistics in Table 1 show relatively large differences in penetration rates across racial groups. It is interesting to use our penetration model to examine the sources of these different penetration rates. In our model there are three possible sources of these differences.
First are different tastes for telephone service across the racial groups-these are captured by the race-specific gamma ( ) and phi ( ) parameters we have estimated.
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Second is the possibility that the distribution of racial groups varies across locations. To the extent that a particular racial group lives disproportionately in locations with either lower prices or better service characteristics, that racial group will tend to have higher adoption rates. Third, particular 40 An alternative would be to assume that the unobservable location characteristics were at their mean, i.e. 0. 41 These taste parameters should be interpreted with care as they could be picking up unmeasured demographic variables that vary across races. To examine this, we use our model to perform an Oaxaca-Blinder style decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) . Specifically, we take each racial group (as well as the entire population) and either change the taste parameters to those of other groups, change the distribution of locations to those of other racial groups, or change the distribution of demographic characteristics to those of other racial groups. given actual taste parameters. Looking across a given row gives a sense of the joint impact of the different gamma and phi parameters on a stable population. Of interest is that other than for Native Americans, the different taste parameters do not generate very large differences in adoption rates. For example, the Asian taste parameters only generate adoption rates about 0.5 percentage points higher than the White taste parameters. This suggests the 1.7 percentage point difference between the predicted penetrations of Asians and Whites is driven by observed location characteristics and demographics, rather than different taste parameters. Table 7 considers hypothetically changing locations of the different racial groups. For example, the cell corresponding to the "White" row and "Asian" column assesses the penetration rate of Whites if they inherited the Asian distribution across locations.
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The diagonal of Table 7 is the model's predicted penetration for each group, as in Table 6 . The difference between penetration with Asian locations and White locations is 2.5 percentage points, larger than the 1.7 difference between the groups when they are assigned their actual locations. The decomposition suggests that Asians tend to live in locations that have significantly better service attributes than other racial groups, i.e. either lower subsidized prices or better observed or unobserved service 42 In doing this, we keep the distribution of (in this case) White demographics constant within each location. There are alternative ways of doing these decompositions. See Elder, Goddeeris, and Haider (2012) and the literature cited there.
characteristics. Also, when Whites inherit the locations of Native Americans, adoption rates only decrease by 1.6 percentage points. In combination with Table 6 , this result suggests that the more than 10 percentage point difference between actual adoption rates of these two groups is primarily driven by the taste parameters. Table 8 shows the last decomposition, where each racial group inherits the distribution of demographic characteristics of each other racial group.
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While Whites appear to have demographic characteristics most conducive to adoption, the differences across rows are generally smaller than the other tables, suggesting that differences in demographic characteristics are less important in driving overall adoption across racial groups than differences in tastes and locations. The Asian penetration is higher than the White penetration in spite of Whites having the demographics most conducive to adoption. Demographic differences do explain more of the difference between Black and White penetration than location differences, but the taste parameters capture most of the difference in penetration.
To conclude, the most striking conclusions from these decompositions are that the very low adoption rates of Native Americans are primarily driven by taste differences, while the very high adoption rates of Asians are primarily driven by the characteristics of locations where Asians live. The difference in penetration rates of Black and White populations appears to be primarily due to taste differences
Policy Experiment
We can use the estimates from the variable φ -40 group model in Table 3 to evaluate the impact of the Lifeline and Linkup plans on low-income penetration.
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The actual penetration rate for low-income households in our sample is 92.1%. Tables 9 and 10 present the Lifeline Endogenous specifications for Lifeline and Linkup together and then separate the impact of each program. In Table 9 , we show the counterfactual penetration rates for the different demographic groups if either or both programs had never existed, and Table 10 conducts a counterfactual exercise in which the programs are expanded together and individually to the maximum levels in areas where they are not fully funded.
The first column of Table 9 shows the counterfactual penetration with neither Lifeline nor Linkup. The column shows the change in penetration for each group (with the standard deviation and 95% confidence interval on the subsequent rows). For example, in the Lifeline Endogenous specification, the overall low-income penetration would drop 6.06 percentage points with a 95 percent confidence interval of a drop between 2.72 and 9.58 percentage points.
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The second column shows the effect of no Lifeline program while maintaining the Linkup program, and the final column shows the effect of no Linkup while maintaining Lifeline. Since we cannot divide the effect of automatic enrollment policies between the two programs, we attribute the full effect of Autoenroll to the remaining program in each of the two counterfactuals.
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Consequently, the effects of changing each program separately do not sum to the effect of changing both program.
47 Table 10 has a similar structure, but estimates the impact of expanding the programs in areas where they are not at the maximum level. This exercise increases the Lifeline subsidy up to $10.50 where it is below that level (unless additional subsidies would lead to a negative monthly price) and increases the Linkup subsidy so that low-income households pay no hookup charges. Expanding both programs in the Lifeline Endogenous case would increase overall penetration by 2.06 percentage points (with a 95% confidence interval between 0.88 and 3.23 percentage points).
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The results in Table 9 and Table 10 indicate that subsidy programs increase penetration more dramatically among low-income renter households than in those that own a home. They also have a much larger impact on younger households. There are slight differences in the impacts across racial groups, but these are much smaller. 45 Standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping. We use a Cholesky decomposition to simulate new coefficients. We assume that the Lifeline and Linkup coefficients are lognormal because positive coefficients would lead to perverse welfare implications. 46 The full effect of Autoenroll on penetration is approximately 0.4 percentage points. Alternatively, we could have attributed only part of this Autoenroll effect to the remaining program in each counterfactual. 47 The nonlinear dependence of penetration on prices also contributes to the individual program effects not adding up to the total effect. Nonlinearity explains less than 0.1 percentage points of the difference, since the linear approximation of log penetration is sufficiently accurate in these counterfactuals. 48 These predictions ignore possibly offsetting factors (Hausman, Tardiff, and Belinfante, 1993) . Federal lowincome subsidy programs are funded by taxes on interstate revenues. To the extent that such extra charges are also borne by low-income households, their bills would decrease somewhat, partially offsetting the increase in hookup and monthly charges.
Consumer Welfare
We can conduct a welfare analysis of the 6.06 percent of our sample who adopt service due to Lifeline and Linkup in our preferred specification. We evaluate welfare in present value terms and find that, within our model, the average consumer receives a surplus of $37 from adopting service at the subsidized price. The average adopter receives a one-time linkup subsidy of $32
and monthly lifeline subsidy of $9, which the consumer values at $34 in present dollars using the monthly discount rate of 27% from our preferred specification. The total present value of the two subsidies is then $66. However, we estimate that the present value of the base prices exceeds the consumers' value of service by an average of $29, so the average consumer is left with a surplus of $37.
Costs
While the cost for an average incremental subscriber is $66 for a consumer surplus of $37, this calculation does not take into account the full costs of the two programs, because there are enrolled households who would have adopted service without any subsidy.
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Though a full welfare analysis taking into account the social benefits of universal service is beyond the scope of this paper, we can estimate the effectiveness of Lifeline and Linkup relative to their overall costs.
First we estimate the amount of federal and state funding for Lifeline and Linkup in our sample. We calculate that funding was $27.4 million for Lifeline and $2.1 million for Linkup for the households in our sample. A description of the methodology is in the Appendix. Federal funding provided approximately three-quarters of the funding with the states adding the rest.
The average new subscriber brought in by the two programs costs $519 per year.
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Our results suggest that Linkup is much more cost effective than Lifeline. Linkup costs less than 8% of the Lifeline program annually. Even if we attribute the full impact of automatic enrollment policies to the Lifeline program, we still find that Linkup has 72% of Lifeline's effect 49 We do not conduct cost counterfactuals because we lack suitable data for measuring how changes in subsidies affect take-up by existing subscribers. 50 Our estimate of the cost per household does not account for eligible households whose income exceeds the poverty level. We estimate that over a quarter of the households eligible for the Lifeline and Linkup programs have incomes above the poverty level. Furthermore, there may be additional costs associated with automatic enrollment polices, as well as other implementation costs.
on predicted penetration. There seem to be at least two reasons why Linkup is more cost effective than Lifeline.
First, recall that our estimates suggest that low-income households have very high discount rates.
Hence, it will be more cost effective for a policymaker (with a more standard discount rate) to subsidize the one-time Linkup price rather than the recurrent monthly Lifeline price. Another reason Linkup is more cost effective is that by definition it is targeted at poor households who do not have telephone service. We estimate that less than 21% of Lifeline expenses in our sample go to households who would not otherwise subscribe to service.
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Our model and cost estimates reveal a wide variety of cost effectiveness of programs across states. suggests there is no link between the penetration effects and cost effectiveness. Cost ineffectiveness is not simply a result of particular states chasing after higher penetration and lower-value consumers.
51 When we attribute the full effects of Autoenroll to Lifeline, the effect of dropping Lifeline on penetration is 3.53 percentage points. We attribute the remaining 2.53 percentage points of the 6.06 total effect of the two programs to Linkup, so the Linkup effect is 72 percent (2.53/3.53) of the Lifeline effect. This calculation measures the effect of Linkup from a baseline of zero subsidies, while the effect of Lifeline is measured from a baseline of actual Linkup subsidies. Since the demand curve is steeper at lower prices in our exponential demand curve, this choice of baselines intentionally biases the result against Linkup. If we instead chose baselines that favor Linkup, then the Linkup effect would be 77 percent (2.65/3.41) of the Lifeline effect. If we also attributed the full effect of Autoenroll to Linkup instead of Lifeline, then the Linkup effect (3.08) would be greater than the Lifeline effect (2.98). 52 We calculate the total Lifeline subsidies going to the 6.06% of households who adopt due to either program according to our model, and divide this total by the observed Lifeline costs of 27 million we project onto our sample. Calculating the corresponding percentage for Linkup is more difficult because the Linkup subsidy is nonrecurring unless a household stops and then renews service. We cannot infer that the Linkup subsidy of our marginal consumers is reflected in the 1999 cost data. 53 As in our full sample calculation, Linkup is more cost-effective in all states, even though our method of attributing the new subscribers to each individual program is biased against Linkup. Both Figures 3 and 4 attribute the effect of automatic enrollment policies on subscribers to Lifeline. Both consider the effect of Linkup from a baseline policy of zero subsidies, while the effect of Lifeline is measured from a baseline of actual Linkup subsidies; consequently, the Linkup effect is measured on a flatter region of our exponential demand curve.
Conclusions
Using price and service data from 6,426 wire centers and demographic data from over a million households, we conclude that low-income subsidy programs have increased low-income telephone penetration by 6.1 percentage points. The conclusion is based on estimated price elasticities of demand with respect to subscription and connection charges for poor households of -0.021 and -0.014 respectively. These estimated elasticities are low but nevertheless somewhat higher than previous estimates for all households. The higher estimates are due substantially to bias corrections that account for the possible endogeneity of Lifeline rates in different locations due to different implementations by state regulators. We find that there are differences in the elasticities of different low-income groups. For racial differences in price sensitivity, we find that taste and demographic differences are important. We find that subsidy programs are most effective at increasing penetration among renters and younger populations.
Even with a relatively low price elasticity of demand, the magnitude of Lifeline and
Linkup programs are sufficient to reduce substantially the effective prices faced by low-income households so that telephone penetration increases significantly as a result of these programs.
The bottom line is that the Lifeline and Linkup programs connected approximately 61 thousand out of 1 million poor households in our sample at an expense of $519 each.
Because of low-income households' high discount rates, the Linkup program has a much higher effect on penetration per dollar spent than the Lifeline program. One possible explanation for this is that low-income households may be credit constrained, and even with the typical 50% discount, initial hookup charges could be daunting. Furthermore, Linkup subsidies are better targeted at households who do not have telephone service. These findings go against the grain of a recent Federal Communications Commission order to eliminate Linkup in most areas (FCC, 2012) . The order reasons that "dollars spent on Linkup in its current form can be more effectively spent to improve and modernize the Lifeline program," because it makes questionable sense "to provide Link Up support to (carriers) with high activation fees" when "many consumers have competitive choices among carriers that do not charge an activation fee and do not draw on Link Up support" (FCC, 2012, pp. 120-121) . Additional one-time subsidies for new connections, however, might encourage providers to offer promotional discounts on Lifeline service to new customers, e.g. free service for the first few months, and thus improve the targeting and efficiency of universal service subsidies.
Appendix -Estimating Lifeline and Linkup expense in our sample
Because the sample of wire centers employed in the study does not cover the whole country, it is necessary to estimate the total cost of the Lifeline and Linkup programs for the areas included in the sample. For two reasons, our data in any particular state do not include all of the households who responded to the Census' telephone availability question: 1) RBOCs do not typically serve the entire state; and 2) we drop wire centers for which we could not identify a unique price.
We employ four main sources of data to estimate the cost of the Lifeline and Linkup The table reports estimated changes in penetration from a counterfactual policy change (specified by the column heading), given the lifeline endogenous parameters (third column of Table 3 ). Standard errors are in parentheses and 95 confidence intervals are in brackets. 
